Introduction
The financial crisis that commenced in late 2007 has been global in nature and of an unprecedented magnitude, as compared to previous episodes of financial turmoil. It has led to historically low interest rates in most advanced economies. In the United States (US), the Federal Funds rate (FFR) reached the zero lower bound in December 2008 and subsequently the Fed adopted a non-conventional monetary policy. The relationship between monetary policy and stock market performance has been extensively studied in the previous literature using a variety of empirical approaches, ranging from vector autoregressive models to event studies (see e.g. Cook and Hahn, 1989; Jensen and Johnson, 1995; Thorbecke, 1997; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) . Previous studies on the US stock market, have widely documented a positive reaction to expansionary monetary policy surprises and state dependence, with the aforementioned reaction being stronger during 'bad times' of negative economic growth and deteriorating financial conditions (see e.g. Basistha and Kurov, 2008; Kurov, 2010) .
Nevertheless, these studies focus on the pre-crisis period and therefore an important question is naturally raised regarding the nature of the relationship between monetary policy and stock market performance during the financial crisis. It is not clear, a priori, how stock market participants will react to interest rate cuts when uncertainty in the macro-financial environment is heightened and monetary policy moves closer to the zero lower bound. In fact, since the onset of the credit crunch and up until early 2009, stock market investors have faced falling stock prices -3 -together with sharp cuts in interest rates, indicating that the inverse relationship between interest rates and stock market valuation has weakened.
Since anticipated policy actions should have already been incorporated in to stock market participants' investment decisions, in line with market efficiency arguments, most of the previous studies focus on the reaction of stock returns to the unexpected component of interest rate changes. In agreement with these studies, we adopt an event study approach and use the methodology proposed by Kuttner (2001) to calculate monetary policy shocks using daily data from FFR futures contracts. These contracts provide real-time information about investors'
expectations regarding future interest rates. As noted in previous research, endogeneity may impose potential econometric problems since monetary policy can be itself reacting to stock market developments (see Rigobon and Sack, 2003) . Nevertheless, the problem of endogeneity in the relationship between monetary policy and stock market performance should be less potent when higher frequency data, such as daily data, are used within an event study framework (see e.g. Bredin et al., 2009; Chen, 2007; Kurov, 2010) .
In this paper we investigate the impact of FFR surprises on US stock returns over the period . As far as we are aware this is the first such paper to analyse data from both the recent financial crisis and the pre-crisis periods. Our results can be summarised as follows.
First, in line with previous literature, we find that prior to the recent financial crisis, stock prices increased as a response to expansionary monetary policy surprises, with an unexpected 1% cut in the FFR being associated with almost a 4% increase in the S&P 500 index. Second, we find that during the pre-crisis period there was state dependence of similar nature to that identified in previous studies. In particular, stock prices exhibited larger increases when interest rate easing -4 -occurred during 'bad times' of recession, bear stock markets, and tightening credit market conditions, indicating asymmetries in the stock market response to monetary policy.
Third, and most importantly, we show that a structural break took place during the financial crisis period, altering the stock market response to FFR shocks, as well as the nature of state dependence with respect to 'good times' versus 'bad times'. Specifically, we find that during the crisis period, stock market participants did not react positively to expansionary FFR surprises. In fact, some of our estimates indicate that there was a statistically significant negative stock market response to the large FFR cuts that took place throughout the financial crisis. The The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the dataset.
Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Data and stylised facts
In this section we analyse the effects of 189 FOMC target rate decisions between June 1989 and December 2009. 1 As Bernanke and Mihov (1998) , among others, point out, the FFR 1 In agreement with most of the previous studies we exclude from our analysis the 17 September 2001 target rate announcement, which took place on the first trading day following the 11 September terrorist attacks (see e.g.
Jansen and Tsai, 2010).
-5 -has been the key policy instrument in the US and therefore unexpected changes in this rate should provide good estimates of policy shocks. Following Kuttner (2001) 2 Quantitative easing (QE) involves altering the Fed's balance sheet composition through significant financial asset purchases in order to support credit markets and to provide economic stimulus. Furthermore, the Fed issued pressrelease statements signalling that the FFR will be kept at the zero bound for a sustained period of time.
3 Rosa (2012) identifies the surprise component of asset purchases by the Fed using a methodology based upon interpreting the wording of related articles in the Financial Times. As he points out, though, the estimates of the response of US asset prices to his measure of unconventional policy shocks are surrounded by considerable statistical uncertainty and, overall, are not significantly different from the response to an unanticipated FFR cut.
-6 -In line with Basistha and Kurov (2008) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) 
where u t i Δ is the unexpected target rate change, , m t f is the current-month implied futures rate (100 minus the futures contract price), and D is the number of days in the month. 5 We measure the expected interest rate change, e t i Δ , as the actual change in the FFR target rate minus the surprise component:
[ 
t i Δ < . The average interest rate change was equal to -0.05%, ranging from a minimum of -0.75% to a maximum of 0.75%. As shown in Figure 1 , large interest rate surprises typically materialise during periods of monetary expansion and during economic deceleration and decline. An important stylised fact which emerges from our preliminary analysis is that recessionary/high financial risk periods are associated with large unexpected FFR cuts. This fact will be taken into account in our econometric analysis since stock market participants may exhibit an alternative response to interest rate cuts when there is heightened macro-financial uncertainty and interest rates move closer to the zero lower bound.
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Econometric models and results

Baseline analysis
We begin our empirical investigation by regressing S&P 500 stock returns during FOMC 
where stock returns, r t , are defined as the first difference of the natural log of the S&P 500 index (S t ) on close of the day of the FOMC meeting, relative to the previous trading day: 1 100*(ln ln )
The OLS estimation results with Newey-West robust standard errors are presented in We also experimented with an alternative specification that includes both expected and unexpected FFR changes, in line with Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) . We found that the former variable tends to remain statistically insignificant both in the baseline regression and throughout most of the subsequent models we estimated (results available upon request). The finding of statistical insignificance of expected FFR changes can be interpreted as evidence consistent with stock market efficiency (see also Chulia et al., 2010) . Following the majority of previous studies (see e.g. Kurov, 2010) we focused on models which include unexpected FFR changes only.
8 Similar evidence is obtained when FOMC meetings coinciding with employment release dates and unscheduled meetings are removed from the sample. Furthermore, we removed outliers identified by the difference in fits statistic of Welsh and Kuh (1977) and the unexpected FFR change remains statistically insignificant. These results can be seen in Table A2 in the Appendix. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the dates associated with unscheduled meetings, employment information releases and outliers.
-9 -significant at the 5% level. 9 Hence, it appears the inclusion of the 2007-2009 financial crisis in the sample leads to statistically insignificant estimates of the FFR shock. This is consistent with previous evidence for the UK by Gregoriou et al. (2009) .
Structural change during the financial crisis
In this section we formally examine whether the full sample findings in Table 2 . 10 Hence, it appears that interest rate 9 Note that our estimates in Table 2 using alternative sample periods are very similar but not always identical to those reported in the previous studies. The differences can be attributed to model specification issues regarding the inclusion (or not) of expected FFR changes. They may also be related to consideration (or not) of unscheduled FOMC meetings, and the meetings that coincide with employment data releases.
10 A similar picture emerges when the unscheduled meeting of 22 January 2008, which was previously identified as an outlier, is excluded (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). That meeting led to a 0.75% cut in the FFR, the largest single cut since October 1984, which took the market fully by surprise (Δi t u = -0.74%). The stock market reaction to the unexpected monetary policy easing was negative with the S&P 500 stock market index declining by 1.1%.
-10 -cuts during the financial crisis period were not perceived as good news by stock market investors. 11 In fact, historically low interest rates may be seen as "a sign of the desperation of central bankers" (The Economist, 18/09/2010), and an indication that future profitability will be lower for some time, thereby signalling bad news for equities.
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We proceed by interacting FFR surprises with a slope dummy variable which intends to capture a change in the relationship between stock returns and FFR shocks during the financial crisis: Table 3 reports OLS estimates of Equation (5). Accounting for structural change in the impact of FFR surprises, leads to an increase in the adjusted R 2 , from 3% in the full sample nobreak results of Table 2 to 7% in Table 3 (see Panel A) . Importantly, the stock market response to the unexpected FFR changes prior to the crisis period, as indicated by β 1 , is negative and statistically significant. During the pre-crisis period, an unexpected 25-basis-point cut in the FFR was associated with almost a 1% increase in the S&P index, a finding consistent with the 11 The last FFR cut took place in December 2008 (-0.75%) and the zero lower bound was reached (point II in Figure   5 ). Since then, the FOMC used a target range for the FFR between 0% and 0.25%.
-11 -estimates of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) , implying that unexpected interest rate easing was interpreted as a good signal by stock market participants. However, the estimated stock market response to FFR shocks during the crisis period, as indicated by β 2 , is no longer negative. The
Wald test for equality of coefficients (H 0 : β 1 =β 2 ) supports a statistically significant structural shift in the relationship between stock returns and FFR shocks. These findings are robust to the definition of the crisis dummy variable (broad versus narrow).
In order to account for Bernanke and Kuttner's (2005) argument that unexpected interest rate changes on days of employment data announcements may in fact reflect endogenous responses to the release of this information, in Table 3 Panel B we show results for nine FOMC meetings that coincide with employment data releases which are removed from the sample. 12 The evidence in Panel B is similar to that in Panel A, which includes all FOMC meetings, identifying a negative and statistically significant impact of unexpected interest rate tightening on stock returns before the recent financial crisis, followed by an insignificant effect during the crisis period. Furthermore, excluding unscheduled FOMC meetings in Table 3 Panel C, leads to smaller and statistically insignificant estimates of the pre-crisis impact of FFR surprises and major deterioration in the fit of the model. This finding is consistent with previous evidence by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Basistha and Kurov (2008) for the pre-crisis period.
[ Table 4 reports MM weighted least squares estimates (Yohai, 1987) of Equation (5). MM estimates are robust in the presence of a large number of outliers (see also Kurov, 2010) . The main difference between the OLS and MM results is that in the latter the coefficient of FFR surprises during the crisis period becomes statistically significant thereby implying a more 12 Furthermore, the stock market itself may be reacting to the employment data releases (see e.g. Boyd et al., 2005 ).
-12 - Gambacorta et al., 2012; Gagnon et al., 2011; Wright, 2011) . Hence, the stock market rebound at the 13 As Farmer (2012) argues, movements in mortgage-backed securities prices should be closely correlated with those in stock prices, since both asset classes tend to perform well when the economy recovers. Farmer (2012) Furthermore, the announcement of the second round of QE in August 2010 coincided closely with another major stock market reversal.
-13 -announcement of QE can be seen as reflecting expectations of an improved future macrofinancial environment.
State dependence and the financial crisis
Finding that interest rate cuts had no positive impact or even depressed stock prices during the recent financial crisis may seem as a surprising result, when seen in the light of previous studies, while at the same time ignoring the fact that monetary policy was operating close to and, after late 2008, at the zero lower bound. These studies typically identify a stronger stock market rebound when monetary expansion coincides with 'bad times' of negative economic growth, bear stock markets, and tightening credit market conditions (see e.g. Chen, 2007; Basistha and Kurov, 2008; Jansen and Tsai, 2010; Kurov, 2010) . 14 Since the [2007] [2008] [2009] crisis was characterised by a credit crunch, an unprecedented deterioration in overall financial conditions and a major recession one would expect to find a strongly negative FFR shocks coefficient during that period. However, as we saw in Tables 3 and 4 , the aforementioned coefficient is either insignificant or positive and significant. This suggests that an important structural shift has taken place in the nature of state dependence which characterises the stock market response to interest rate surprises.
In order to ensure we obtain results consistent with the previous literature for the precrisis period, we estimate Equation (6) which interacts FFR surprises with a slope interactive 14 Note that there are some studies that measure monetary policy surprises using survey data, rather than data on FFR futures as in this paper, and do not identify state dependence with respect to the state of the economy and credit market conditions (see e.g. Andersen et al., 2007 
where D t st is defined as follows: (a) real time recession probability obtained from the dynamicfactor markov-switching model of Chauvet and Piger (2008) ; (b) dummy variable equal to one when the BAA-10 year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample historical average, signifying high credit risk periods, and zero otherwise; (c) dummy variable equal to one when the S&P 500 stock price index is lower than its full sample 3 year moving average, indicating a bear stock market regime, and zero otherwise.
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The MM weighted least squares estimates of Equation (6) in Table 5 show that, in agreement with the previous literature, during the pre-crisis period the impact of monetary policy surprises on stock returns is stronger during recessionary episodes, and periods of sustained stock price declines and worsening credit market conditions. 16 More specifically, the estimated stock market response to interest rate shocks during 'bad times', as indicated by β 2 , is statistically significant and more negative as compared to the response during 'good times', as indicated by β 1 . For example, excluding FOMC meetings which coincide with employment data releases, the results in Panel B show that prior to recent financial crisis, an unexpected 100-basis-point cut in the FFR was associated with almost a 9% increase in the S&P index during periods of high credit 15 While there is no commonly accepted definition in the literature, ours is consistent with, what Jansen and Tsai (2010) term as, the 'common understanding' of a bear stock market regime, that is, a period of significant and sustained stock price declines.
-15 -risk, while the corresponding increase was much smaller, around 2%, during periods of low credit risk. The Wald test for equality of the FFR shocks coefficient across 'good times' and 'bad times' typically rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. Thus, the empirical results in Table 5 confirm the findings from previous studies on the pre-crisis period by identifying statistically and economically significant state dependence in the relationship between FFR shocks and stock market performance, in line with the credit channel of monetary policy transmission.
Finally, we estimate Equation (7) 
The MM weighted least squares estimates of Equation (7) are shown in Table 6 . 17 In line with the results in Table 6 , thereby suggesting that our results are robust to the treatment of unscheduled FOMC meetings and those which coincided with employment data releases.
[ The empirical results in Table 6 
Further robustness checks
We further examined the robustness of our findings in a number of ways. 19 First, we experimented with alternative variables to capture state dependence with respect to 'good times' versus 'bad times' and found that the results remain quantitatively and qualitatively similar.
18 It should be noted that the crisis period is dominated by worsening financial conditions. Hence, the high credit risk 19 To save space these results are not reported but are available upon request.
Specifically, in order to proxy the state of the economy we used a dummy variable equal to one when there is a recession according to the NBER, while a dummy variable based upon the BAA-AAA corporate bond spread was employed to measure credit market conditions (see also Basistha and Kurov, 2008) . Moreover, we used an alternative proxy for bear market conditions, a dummy variable equal to one if the 3 year S&P 500 return is less than -20%. Finally, we trimmed from our sample period the last year (2009) 
Conclusions
This Table A1 outliers were identified using the difference in fits (DFITS) statistic.
Appendix
-22 - Table A2 reports OLS estimates with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors of Equation (3) -24 - -26 - -27 - Table 4 reports Robust MM weighted least squares estimates (Yohai, 1987) of Equation (6) Table 5 reports Robust MM weighted least squares estimates (Yohai, 1987) of Equation (6) Table 6 reports Robust MM weighted least squares estimates (Yohai, 1987) of Equation (7) over FOMC meeting dates: defined as follows: (a) real time recession probability obtained from the dynamic-factor markov-switching model of Chauvet and Piger (2008) ; (b) dummy variable equal to one when the BAA-10 year Treasury bond spread exceeds its full sample historical average, and zero otherwise; (c) dummy variable equal to one when the S&P 500 stock price index is lower than its full sample 3 year moving average, and zero otherwise. Notes: Figure 1 shows the FFR change and FFR unexpected change on FOMC meeting dates over the period June 1989 to December 2009. The shaded area is associated with NBER recession dates. The dotted line indicates the real time recession probability obtained from the dynamic-factor markov-switching model of Chauvet and Piger (2008) . The recession probability data is available at: http://pages.uoregon.edu/jpiger/us_recession_probs.htm. -31 - -32 - 
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